Call for Evidence: Strategy for the built environment professions, trades and occupations

3.1. Our buildings and built environment fundamentally shape how we live, work and interact, influencing every aspect of society from economic productivity to public health, to our day-to-day safety and quality of life. The people who design, build, manage and maintain these environments – and the knowledge, skills and behaviours they bring to their role – are therefore central to driving better social and economic outcomes for individuals and the country as a whole.

3.2. The Grenfell Tower tragedy, and the Inquiry that followed, laid bare how fundamentally the system that governs those working in the built environment had failed. The Inquiry’s Phase 2 report was unambiguous. It concluded that the “safety of people in the built environment depends principally on a combination of three primary elements, good design, the choice of suitable materials and sound methods of construction, each of which depends in turn in a large measure on a fourth, the skill, knowledge and experience of those engaged in the construction industry. … at the time of the Grenfell Tower fire there were serious deficiencies in all four”.

3.3. This was not an isolated problem. Successive reviews stretching back to at least the 1940s have repeatedly identified the same failings: a system characterised by fragmented accountability, inadequate standards of professionalism, and persistent failures of competence and ethical behaviour, operating largely unchecked, across the entire industry, for decades. These system failures are reflected in the sector’s economic performance. Low productivity, high volatility resulting from exposure to wider economic trends and persistent workforce challenges mirror a sector in which business models can reward perceived or short-term improvements in speed and reductions in cost to the detriment of actual, long-term quality, safety and innovation. 

3.4. Behind this system are individuals and organisations who have invested significant time, effort and money in building their skills and professional judgment, and who take pride in delivering buildings and places that are safe, high quality and valued by the people who use them. There are many aiming to deliver the highest standards possible, even whilst often operating under significant time, cost and commercial pressures. However, where the system does not consistently support and reinforce good practice, the consequences fall unevenly: at further cost to the individual, and in some cases reducing the ability of responsible businesses to invest, innovate and flourish.

3.5. The landscape for those working in the built environment reinforces this dynamic. There are a multitude of standards, accreditation routes and requirements for competence, with qualification often (though not always) a one-time credential rather than an ongoing guarantee. In many cases, professional and trade body membership remains voluntary, with limited incentives to participate when this is not an essential requirement and limited ability to prevent those disqualified from such schemes from continuing to practice. Despite significant endeavours to raise standards, competence remains primarily reliant on individual or organisational capacity and motivation to maintain and improve skills. In a sector where cost-cutting runs through every stage of decision-making, there is a risk that existing education, regulation and standards provide false assurance to consumers and do not adequately reward those who invest in achieving and demonstrating high standards.

3.6. Persistent faultlines with information and accountability also run throughout the wider system. Those commissioning and occupying buildings cannot readily assess the competence or integrity of those building them. Poor performance is difficult to detect; good performance is difficult to signal. The market cannot distinguish between those who meet high standards and those who do not, and often failure may not be observable until harm occurs years later. This is particularly acute in the domestic market where opportunities for consumer redress are limited when things go wrong.

3.7. Reform has been attempted many times and too often has been partial, unevenly implemented or deprioritised. The reforms that followed the Grenfell Tower tragedy were necessary and significant, but they are not sufficient. We have already committed to implementing the Inquiry’s recommendations in full, as well as going further to take a holistic view of the full system. This full system approach will address safety, quality and productivity together, and consider what conditions the system needs to create for individuals and organisations to thrive. This call for evidence takes forward that work, asking not just what has gone wrong, but why it keeps going wrong, and what it will take to change it.